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In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson
launched the most ambitious effort in American
history to eliminate poverty. Known as the
Great Society, this effort consisted of a variety of
social programs designed to alleviate the prob-
lems of the poor. Declaring that “the days of the
dole in this country are numbered,” Johnson
sought to provide short-term assistance to the
able-bodied poor in the belief that it would
enable recipients to lift themselves out of
poverty; the smaller population of individuals
who could not work would receive long-term
support. The belief that poor individuals would
escape poverty if given short-term support was
echoed by the New York Times, whose editorial
board claimed that the ultimate benefits of the
War on Poverty would be reaped through “the
long-term reduction of the need for government
assistance” (Royal 1985).
An enormous number of people entered
the welfare rolls as a result of Great Society pro-
grams. However, the hope that they would use
the programs as “a hand, not a handout” was
unrealized. The poverty rate, which had been
declining since World War II, began to rise
despite a twentyfold increase in social welfare
expenditures (Novak 1985). Increasingly, the
ranks of the poor were composed of single-
parent families and an “underclass” of able-
bodied males who remained in poverty 
considerably longer than poor two-parent
households (Mead 1991; Murray 1992). Great
Society supporters suggested that higher welfare
benefit payments were needed in order to care
for long-term recipients, while opponents found
themselves accused of indifference to the plight
of the poor.
Indifference is clearly one reason some-
one might favor a reduction in welfare benefits.
However, an increasing number of analysts
have argued in favor of such a reduction for 
the sake of the poor (Murray 1984; Novak 1985).
By providing income to those individuals who
do not work, welfare discourages recipients
from entering the labor force and encourages
workers to join the welfare rolls, aggravating 
the unemployment problem and lowering the
rate at which the economy can grow.
Traditional notions of altruism assume that 
compassion for the poor is measured by one’s
willingness to redistribute income, but, to the
extent that more generous support for the 
poor actually encourages recipiency, welfare
programs simultaneously mitigate and exacer-
bate the problem of poverty. It is therefore 
conceivable that altruism, when defined as 
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P olicies formed by tough 
love will result in less
redistribution to the poor but
also result in greater labor
force participation than would
be the case under policies
motivated solely by concern for
the income of the poor.26
ber of poor, could imply “tough love” toward
welfare recipients.
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This article explores the differing impli-
cations of traditional altruism and the “new
altruism,” which combines the traditional with
tough love. The first section of this article
describes the economic model. Next, the article
introduces the model’s political framework and
demonstrates that, when altruism is defined in
the traditional sense, a relatively altruistic indi-
vidual will prefer relatively generous welfare
benefits. The following section compares the
public policies favored by a traditional altruist
and an otherwise identical new altruist. It shows
that benefit levels are unambiguously higher
under the traditional altruist but that labor force 
participation is unambiguously higher under 
the new altruist. The conclusion summarizes
these points.
The economic model
Consider a system of jurisdictions, which
are inhabited by individuals for whom migra-
tion is both costless and unrestricted. These
mobile individuals may choose whether to enter
the labor force. Employed individuals are
endowed with one unit of labor, which must be
used to produce the numeraire according to a
production function fi(ei), where ei denotes 
the number of employed individuals in juris-
diction  i. In exchange for their labor, employed
individuals receive their marginal product,
f ¢ i(ei), from the jurisdiction. Poor individuals, 
by contrast, receive no labor endowment but
obtain welfare payments from their jurisdiction.
A jurisdiction may engage in neither wage nor
benefit discrimination.
In addition to wages and benefits, each
person receives disutility from congestion, and
every employed individual receives disutility
from work. I assume a congestion function of
the form ci(pi + ei), where ci is the monetized
value of congestion and pi represents the num-
ber of welfare recipients in jurisdiction i.
2
I assume that each individual has a finite dis-
utility value, which expresses, in monetary
terms, the degree to which that individual is
averse to work.
Since migration is costless, the net income
of the poor must be equalized across jurisdic-
tions, and the net income of the employed must
also be equalized across jurisdictions. These
incomes are given by
(1) Y
P = bi + ci(pi + ei),
and
(2) Y
E = f ¢ i(ei) + ci(pi + ei),
where bi represents the benefit level in juris-
diction i.
In addition to these individuals, I suppose
that each jurisdiction contains a single immo-
bile landowner. This landowner claims any
residual profits from the production process 
and finances redistributive benefits.
3 The net
income of the landowner is
(3) Y
L
i = fi(ei) – ei f ¢ i(ei) – bipi,
where fi(ei) – ei f ¢ i(ei) is the residual profit from
production (output less wages), and bipi is the
total benefit payment from the landowner to 
the poor in his jurisdiction.
Given these assumptions, it is possible to
characterize the behavior of mobile individuals
under a change in benefit policy. When a 
jurisdiction increases its level of redistributive
benefits, poor people will immigrate and
employed people will emigrate until the net
incomes of both groups are equalized across
jurisdictions. This movement spreads the impact
of the increase across every jurisdiction, ensur-
ing that every welfare recipient is aided by the
increase but that no recipient reaps the full
amount of the increase. The increase also
induces a certain number of workers to leave
the workforce, which reduces the total number
of workers and thereby lowers the gross domes-
tic product of the system of jurisdictions.
A decision-making framework
The previous section establishes an eco-
nomic framework from which to examine re-
distributive policy. However, redistribution is as
much a political as an economic process. For
this reason, the motivations of political actors
are crucially important to the study of redis-
tribution. This section surveys existing political
models and examines optimal redistributive 
policy under the most common model: the
landowner/policymaker.
Perhaps the most important result in politi-
cal theory is the median voter theorem of
Bowen (1943) and Black (1948). This theorem
gives conditions under which, when each voter
has a most-preferred policy and judges other
alternatives by their distance from that policy,
the preference of the median voter cannot be
beaten in a majority vote. When governments
act in accordance with median voter theory, an
analyst who can describe the preferences of the
median voter has a complete description of
political outcomes. The intuitive appeal ofFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       27 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1997
median-voter theory in democratic states has led
to its use in a wide variety of applications,
including several associated with the debate
about redistributive policy (Brown and Oates
1987; Epple and Romer 1991). There is also
empirical evidence to suggest that median-voter
theory is relevant to discussions of politics
(Stigler 1970; Inman 1978).
Substantial anecdotal evidence about
excessive government spending prompted a
renewed examination of the extent to which
government behavior is consistent with median-
voter theory. In a seminal analysis, Niskanen
(1971, 1975) concludes that government ser-
vices are provided by inefficient bureaucracies
that have an incentive to overproduce. This
analysis is extended by Romer and Rosenthal
(1979), who argue that politicians also increase
the size of government through their ability to
restrict the set of policies over which voters may
choose. Empirical studies on a variety of gov-
erning bodies—ranging from Oregon school
districts to the government of the United
States—provide support for the big-government
thesis (Romer and Rosenthal 1982; Peltzman
1992). This evidence suggests that a simple
median-voter framework is inappropriate for
analyses of redistribution.
While both the median-voter and the
bureaucratic approaches offer insights into
political behavior, the most common political
model in analyses of migration and redistribu-
tion is the landowner/policymaker. In the tradi-
tion of Pauly (1973), these analyses assume that
the poor abstain from politics and permit im-
mobile landowners to control government 
policy. Examples include the “profit-maximizing
communities” of Sonstelie and Portney (1978)
and Epple and Zelenitz (1981), the “bad poli-
tics” scenarios of Henderson (1985) and Hoyt
(1993), and the analytical work of Wildasin
(1991). Because of its prevalence in the litera-
ture, the landowner/policymaker is the political
model employed here.
Consider a landowner who is empowered
to change the level of redistributive benefits
provided by the landowner’s jurisdiction. Land-
owners who feel no altruism toward the poor
will simply maximize their net income. From
equation 3, the landowner receives the residual
income from the production process but
finances redistributive benefits from this re-
sidual. The change in residual income from a
small increase in benefits is given by
where R denotes output less total wages, and
the change in total redistribution from the
landowner to the poor is given by
Since redistribution unambiguously lowers
residual income, the landowner would never
choose a positive level of redistributive benefits.
Suppose, however, that the landowner is
altruistic in the traditional sense of desiring a
higher net income for the poor. This altruism
could derive from personal convictions, or the
landowner may behave in an altruistic manner
to retain political office. Denote the landowner’s
(monetized) benefit from altruism as li(Y
P) > 0,
and suppose that the function is increasing in its
argument at a decreasing rate. Although the
landowner would oppose redistributive benefits
in the absence of altruism, a sufficiently high
level of altruism will induce support for welfare
benefits. To examine the conditions under
which an altruistic landowner would be willing
to redistribute, it is necessary to examine the
comparative statics of the system. The derivative
of the altruism function with respect to a change
in redistributive benefits is given by
and the condition under which the poli-
tician would choose to increase redistributive
benefits is
Rewriting this equation as
demonstrates that there is a unique level of
altruism above which the landowner will
engage in redistribution. In other words, a
landowner who is sufficiently concerned about
the income level of the poor will redistribute,
while one who is not, will not.
Redistributive policy and the new altruism
Although redistribution raises the income
of the poor, it provides an incentive for able-
bodied individuals to choose welfare benefits
over work. This section examines the behavior
of new altruist policymakers who simultane-
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reduce their ranks. It demonstrates that policies
favored by the new altruist will always result 
in less redistribution to the poor than would
policies formed by a traditional altruist. It also
shows that new altruist policies will always
result in fewer welfare recipients (and a higher
number of workers) than would policies formed
by a traditional altruist.
Consider a new altruist who values both
greater income for the poor and fewer people
in the ranks of the poor. Suppose that these
terms are separable, such that the total altruistic
benefits reaped by the new altruist are of the
form li = l1(Y
P) + l2(åpi). It can be shown that
an increase in redistributive benefits increases
the total number of poor individuals by some
positive level and that the total change in
landowner utility derived from altruism is
Equation 9 demonstrates that the new
altruist is always less willing to redistribute than
is an otherwise identical altruist to whom the
number of poor is irrelevant. However, it also
suggests that it is possible for the new altruist 
to favor more redistribution than would tradi-
tional altruist, as would be the case if, for 
example, the traditional altruist (l2 = 0) in ques-
tion were primarily concerned about his or her
own income, while the new altruist (l2 > 0)
were primarily concerned about the income of
the poor. Thus, new altruism is consistent with
any level of welfare expenditures. What is
unique about the new altruist is a willingness to
trade a portion of the poor’s income for a reduc-
tion in their ranks.
The willingness to reduce welfare benefits
in the name of the poor has led some to ques-
tion the new altruist’s sincerity. Ironically,
income distribution arguments made by redistri-
bution proponents could also justify a reduction
in welfare benefits. Thurow (1971), for exam-
ple, argues that society is better off under a
more equal distribution of income. However,
welfare expenditures have an indeterminate
effect on income distribution: they help the
poor while simultaneously encouraging middle-
income workers to become poor. To the extent
that welfare programs discourage labor force
participation, then a reduction in redistribution
might be justifiable—which is precisely the
argument new altruists make.
Conclusion
This article examines the economic and
political ramifications of tough love for redis-
tributive policy. It confirms the traditional result
that a politician who feels no altruism toward
the poor would not engage in redistribution. It
shows that a traditional altruist might engage in
redistribution if the desire to help the poor is
sufficiently strong. Finally, it models the prefer-
ences of an altruism that incorporates tough
love and describes the implications of those
preferences. Policies formed by tough love will
result in less redistribution to the poor but also
result in greater labor force participation than
would be the case under policies motivated
solely by concern for the income of the poor.
This article has important implications for
American public policy, both because of the
results it demonstrates and those it does not
demonstrate. It shows that the broader defini-
tion of altruism held by the new altruist leads
one to favor less generous welfare benefits than
would an otherwise identical traditional altruist.
But it does not show that the new altruist
wishes to reduce or abolish redistribution: a
new altruist is perfectly willing to support a gen-
erous welfare benefit system if the labor force
consequences are sufficiently low. This article
suggests that efforts such as the Great Society
can have significant work-disincentive effects,
but it does not show that the Great Society itself
should be viewed as a failure by the new altru-
ist. A traditional altruist whose altruism is suffi-
ciently low could reject Great Society programs,
and a new altruist whose concern for the
income of the poor is sufficiently high could
embrace them.
Finally, this article shows that both sup-
port of and opposition to welfare benefit pro-
grams are consistent with altruism, but does not
show that every real-world policymaker is moti-
vated by altruism in making judgments about
welfare. People can oppose redistribution
because they do not wish to give up their
income to the poor, and people can support
redistribution because they do not object to
spending other people’s income on the poor.
The conclusions reached in this article suggest
the need for a renewed examination of the pol-
icy proposals of the new altruists and a renewed
effort to understand the impact of redistributive
programs on labor force participation.
Notes
1 There are, of course, welfare recipients who cannot
work because of physical disability. Neither the new
altruists nor Great Society supporters suggest that
these individuals would benefit from tough love.
2 For purposes of this article, one can assume that the
congestion is the result of a fixed supply of housing 
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for which all residents must bid. Congestion might also
result from a fixed supply of public goods, such as
parks and roads.
3 The theoretical analysis holds for a variety of financing
arrangements, provided the arrangement does not 
violate the landowner’s position as residual claimant.
An example of such an arrangement is a payroll tax 
on workers under which the landowner must finance
the difference between payroll tax collections and 
benefit disbursements.
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